An accredited investor redeems a tokenized US Treasury fund across borders. Two compliance properties must be proven without exposing PII to the counterparty or settlement network: the investor's accreditation and the asset's tokenization eligibility. The customer's browser generates ZK proofs; the VRID attestation engine issues a tamper-evident artifact for each check; both VRIDs are then anchored on Base L2 — written to the VRID registry and recorded in the Master FCR Audit log.
W3C Verifiable Credential issued via MATTR VII · JWT-VC · ES256 / P-256 · held in customer's keypair
Noir / UltraHONK · WASM · Poseidon2 in-circuit hash · ~14.6 KB proof · ~33 ms verify · attribute proven without revealing data
vrid.js v2.3 · NIST SHA-3-256 receipt hash of the proof bundle · records that a specific check passed at a specific time, without recording underlying data
CB95 registry on Base Sepolia · Keccak-256 commitment · independently verifiable by auditor, regulator, or counterparty
Per-customer chained sequence · on-chain Keccak-256 hash of [prevVridHash · commitment · payload · timestamp] · class metadata (I, T, K, M, E) · tamper-evident
Designed to sit alongside interbank settlement rails and tokenized-asset routing layers — not to replace them. Receipt portability across counterparties is architectural intent; live counterparty integrations are not yet shipped. Currently active circuit: CR-05 (KYC clearance) backing FCR-I entries. Class-T attestation circuit wires in at the next milestone.